If your 3-year-old daughter were to ask you where the stars come from, would you spontaneously infer that she is a curious and smart girl (and start fantasizing about her future career as being, perhaps, academic), or would you simply note that she asked a smart question? Research suggests that, rather than making an objective and restrained analysis of her behavior, you are very likely to form immediate impressions about her talents and intelligence. Numerous investigations have indicated that people often make judgments about other's dispositional characteristics even after one single action and for people that they met only for the first time. These dispositional inferences often occur spontaneously, that is, without any intention or awareness on the perceiver's part to make them (Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Uleman, 1987; Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994; Winter & Uleman, 1984; Winter, Uleman, & Cunniff, 1985 ; for a recent review, see Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996) . Inferring people's dispositions or traits from their behavior has important social functions. It helps us to describe and understand people and their behaviors, to predict what to expect from them, and to prepare smooth interactions with them (Uleman, Newman, et al., 1996) . Sometimes we make such inferences very deliberately and systematically to gain information about a person, and it is evident that in such situations the inferred traits refer to the actor in a manifest way; that is, there is a direct link in explicit memory between the trait and the actor (Uleman, Newman, et al., 1996) . However, when inferences are spontaneous and unintentional, it may be that the inferred traits are not so much a manifest description of the actor's dispositions but merely serve as interpretation of the actor's behavior. This may strongly reduce the potential effects these spontaneous trait inferences may have on our impressions of and interactions with other persons. Hence, an important question is whether spontaneous inferences indeed refer to the actor or only to his or her actions. This has been the topic of recent debate and research (e.g., Bassili, 1989a Bassili, , 1989b Bassili, , 1993 Moskowitz, 1993b; Moskowitz & Roman, 1992; Stapel, Koomen, & van der Pligt, 1996; Uleman, Moskowitz, Roman, & Rhee, 1993) and is the focus of this article.
The distinction between the role of trait terms as descriptions of behaviors or as person attributes is in line with current processing models of dispositional attributions (e.g., Carlston & Skowronski, 1986; Gilbert, 1989; Trope & Lieberman, 1993) . These models assume that attributions to person dispositions are inferred in two stages: First, the observed behavior is categorized in trait terms by applying general knowledge (e.g., behavioral schemas, Bassili, 1989b) ; next, this behavioral categorization serves as input to the actual inference process in which the trait is attributed to the person who engaged in the behavior. Some of these models also assume that trait inferences are only made if there is sufficient motivation or attention (e.g., Gilbert, 1989) or after a deliberative evaluation process (e.g., Carlston & Skowronski, 1986) . Hence, the current literature suggests that although trait inferences may become spontaneously associated with the actor's behaviors, they do not necessarily become directly associated with the actor.
The ambiguity in people's use of trait terms has led several researchers to explore evidence that spontaneous trait inferences are manifestly or directly associated with actors. Several methods have been used. On the basis of studies using a cued-recall paradigm, Uleman and his colleagues concluded that there is no evidence to date for an explicit or manifest association between spontaneous trait inferences and the actor (Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994; Uleman et al., 1993) . In a cued-recall paradigm, if trait inferences are made during encoding of some behavioral descriptions (e.g., "The girl asked where the stars come from") and directly stored or associated with the actor, then the implied trait (e.g., curious) should be an effective retrieval cue for the actor. To ensure that trait inferences are made without intention or awareness, participants are typically given the instruction to simply read or memorize the sentences.
Although earlier studies documented that trait cues are more effective in actor recall than no cue, these studies are open to an alternative explanation. It is possible that trait cues may enable participants to retrieve the actors indirectly by first retrieving the actor's behaviors, which are linked in turn to the actor (Carlston & Skowronki, 1986) . To avoid such indirect links, more recent studies mea-sured trait-cued recall of the actor while controlling for the trait-cued recall of the behavior. For instance, trait-cued recall of the actor was analyzed only for the subset of sentences in which the behavior was also recalled. These analyses showed no superiority of traitcued recall of the actor over and above the recall of the behavior (Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994; Uleman et al., 1993) . Thus, it was concluded that there are no direct or manifest links between the inferred traits and the actor. Greater trait-cued recall of the actor above the recall of the behavior was, however, found when participants where explicitly instructed to form impressions about the actors (and thus, they deliberately made inferences about the actor) (Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994) or among participants high in need for structure (who are more likely to engage in social categorization processes) (Moskowitz, 1993a) .
The same lack of direct trait-actor associations was suggested using other methods that attempted to measure spontaneous inferences under conditions that do not in-volve an actor or actor cues. For instance, Bassili (1989a) measured spontaneous trait inferences using a trait-fragment completion task, in which participants were asked to complete trait words from which letters had been deleted. This technique is very sensitive to prior activation of a trait, even if participants are unaware of this activation. Bassili compared spontaneous trait completion in the absence of actor cues to aid recall with trait completion under impression formation instructions. He found that participants encoded the same amount of trait inferences under both conditions, indicating that "trait concepts can be activated without being associated with the actors" (p. 293). Similarly, Claeys (1990) had participants read and memorize traitimplying sentences with no actors at all, and found that spontaneous trait inferences were made even without an actor. Overall, these studies suggest that spontaneous trait inferences often serve to interpret behavior rather than to describe the actor.
However, a common limitation of these methods is that they may not have been most appropriate for detecting explicit trait-actor links. First, the cued-recall and trait-fragment completion tasks take place only after considerable delay. Second, in the cued-recall paradigm, the method of dropping sentences in which behavior was not recalled to control for behavior recall (Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994; Uleman et al., 1993) also may have reduced actor recall. This is because most existing theoretical models of dispositional attribution specify that traits become associated with the actor only after they were first associated with the behavior, thus implying that limiting the analysis to traits for which the behavior is recalled should not lead to superior recall of the actor (except when trait-actor links are stronger, as might be the case under impression formation instructions). Third, revealing spontaneous trait inferences without actor cues (Bassili, 1989a) or actors (Claeys, 1990) does not necessarily imply that direct associations would not have been revealed if actors or actor cues were present. Consistent with this reasoning, Bassili (1989a) found stronger trait inferences when actor cues were provided after reading trait-implying sentences.
These shortcomings were avoided in a series of recent studies by Carlston and Skowronski (1994) (see also Carlston, Skowronski, & Sparks, 1995) in which traitactor associations were compared when participants were encouraged to make trait inferences or when given Van Overwalle et al. / SPONTANEOUS TRAIT INFERENCES 451 no such instructions using a relearning paradigm. In this paradigm, participants are exposed to person photos with behavioral descriptions and then learn a series of photo-trait pairs. If trait inferences occur spontaneously during exposure to the photos, then (re)learning these photo-trait links should become much easier. Using this paradigm, it was found that trait inferences were equally strong under both impression formation and reading instructions. Given that the trait inferences made by the participants under intentional impression formation instructions explicitly depend on the existence of a link between the trait and the actor (photo), these results seem to suggest that unintentional or spontaneous inferences also refer explicitly to the actor, casting doubt on previous studies that suggested no such explicit traitactor links. Other studies using indirect methods for revealing trait inferences by studying their impact on assimilation and contrast effects (Moskowitz & Roman, 1992; Stapel et al., 1994) or on person organization (Moskowitz, 1993b) provide further support for the position that trait inferences manifestly refer to actor dispositions.
DIRECTLY TESTING TRAIT-ACTOR AND TRAIT-ACTION LINKS
None of the earlier attempts to detect explicit traitactor inferences directly tested the existence of traitactor and trait-action associations under the same processing goals (e.g., reading instructions). If, however, traits are encoded both with the actor and the action, then it should be possible to reveal a significant association of the trait with the actor as well as with the verb summarizing the action.
To explore this hypothesis, we took a modified version of a trait recognition paradigm that was recently introduced by Uleman, Hon, Roman, and Moskowitz (1996) to assess spontaneous trait inferences. This paradigm represents a more valid and perhaps more sensitive measure of spontaneous encoding processes than previous procedures that measured trait inferences after some delay, because delayed measures run the risk of reflecting strategic retrieval processes rather than spontaneous encoding. For instance, it is possible that when participants attempted to recall the original actors or behaviors in the cued-recall procedure but could not remember them, they may have used the trait cues to generate typical behaviors that exemplify the trait concept and were so reminded of the specific behaviors and actors in the experiment (Wyer & Srull, 1989, p. 146) . Although previous researchers took many precautions to minimize such strategic processes, the trait recognition paradigm eliminates these potential confounds because it measures encoding of trait inferences on-line, that is, immediately after reading each behavioral description.
In a typical recognition procedure, participants read a short paragraph on a computer screen, which is followed by a recognition probe word. The participants' task is to decide as quickly and accurately as possible whether the probe word was in the paragraph. If the probe word is a trait that was not actually part of the paragraph but the trait was spontaneously encoded during reading, it is more difficult to reject the trait as not being a part of the paragraph. Thus, trait inferences interfere with quick and accurate responses, leading to either increased response times (RTs) or increased error rates (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986, Experiment 1) . Applying this on-line procedure, Uleman, Hon, et al. (1996) found consistent evidence that trait inferences are spontaneously encoded as indicated by higher error rates and longer RTs for trait probes.
The trait recognition paradigm is particularly attractive because it goes against ostensible task demands: If participants make spontaneous inferences, it actually inhibits their responses on the recognition task. Moreover, McKoon and Ratcliff (1986, Experiment 3) developed a variant of the original recognition procedure that allows one to test which sentence parts or words are associated with the trait in memory. In this procedure, associations in memory are tested by priming recognition with a critical word from the paragraph. For instance, to test whether the inferred trait is associated with the actor, trait recognition is immediately preceded by a short 200 ms presentation of an actor prime. If the trait is associated with the actor in memory, priming by the actor would make it even more difficult to decide that the trait was not part of the paragraph. This would result in increased inhibition of the response, that is, slower RTs or increased error rates in comparison with priming by a neutral cue such as the word ready.
This primed recognition procedure was applied in the present experiments to explore direct trait-actor associations in comparison with trait-action associations. After reading trait-implying paragraphs, participants were given a recognition task that was primed by either an actor cue, a verb cue (summarizing the action), or a neutral "ready" cue. Our expectation was that a greater inhibition of responses would appear not only after the verb prime but also after the actor prime in comparison with the neutral prime. Thus, we hoped that using this more sensitive procedure would provide evidence that under some conditions, spontaneous trait inferences are directly associated with both the action and the actor.
In the first experiment, we tested the assumption that when participants read simple trait-implying behavioral descriptions, they immediately and spontaneously make associations from the implied trait to the behavior and also to the actor who engaged in the behavior. We explored this issue using McKoon and Ratcliff's (1986) recognition paradigm with the actor and the verb as experimental primes and the word ready as a control prime. It was expected that the verb prime would result in a strong inhibition compared to the neutral prime. More important, if traits are directly associated with the actor as we expect, then using the actor as a prime would also result in a strong inhibition. Conversely, if no direct trait-actor associations are formed, then no such inhibition would result given the actor as a prime. Note that we expect inhibition to be revealed in either a reduced accuracy level, a slower RT, or both. Because the priming effect we are looking for may be quite weak, inhibition in one of these measures is sufficient evidence for our hypotheses (see also Uleman, Hon, et al., 1996) .
METHOD

Participants
Participants were 77 male and female 1st-year students at the Dutch Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Belgium) who were participating in this experiment as part of an introductory psychology course requirement. The experiment was announced as a study in reading ability. To make sure that participants had understood the instructions and had been sufficiently attentive during the experiment, we tallied how often they erroneously reported that a trait word had appeared in the 12 experimental sentences (although the trait was actually absent). Because none of the participants made more than six (or 50%) errors, they were all included for analysis.
Stimulus Materials
The trait-implying sentences in this experiment were taken from the 34 sentences used in the probe recognition studies by Uleman, Hon, et al. (1996) . The sentences were translated (and slightly adapted where necessary), and a Dutch name was randomly provided for each actor. This name served as an actor prime. The sentences were then tested and selected in a pilot study. Drawn from the same population, 89 students were asked to indicate for each sentence three words (traits) that described which sort of person the actor was. The given traits were aggregated using close synonyms from a dictionary and served as trait probe words. Half of the participants also indicated one word from the sentence that best described the sort of activity in which the actor was engaged. In the selected sentences, these words were always verbs, which served as verb primes. (Note that these were single words from the sentences and not summaries such as the gist cues that have been used in prior research.) There were 12 sentences for which at least 70% of the participants provided the same trait (or a close synonym) and for which at least 70% of the participants provided the same verb as action description (see Table 1 ). These sentences were selected as experimental stimulus material for this and the following experiments.
Procedure
The whole procedure, including instructions, presentation of sentences, prime and probe words, feedback, and fillers, was closely modeled after Experiment 3 of McKoon and Ratcliff (1986) . Participants were seated in front of an IBM-compatible personal computer, and instructions and practice trials appeared on the screen. Participants were told that after reading two paragraphs, they had to decide whether a probe word exactly matched one of the words in the paragraphs. To encourage participants to pay attention to the prime also, this word was introduced as an aid that would help them in this decision.
At each experimental trial, two short paragraphs were presented one at a time. One paragraph was an experimental trait-implying sentence, and the other was a filler paragraph composed of two or three sentences (translated from filler paragraphs used by Uleman, Hon, et al., 1996) . The order in which the two paragraphs appeared was randomized. Experimental paragraphs composed of one line were presented for 4 seconds, and those composed of two lines were presented for 6 seconds. Filler paragraphs composed of two lines were presented for 5 seconds, and those composed of three lines for 7 seconds. Between paragraphs, there was a pause of 2 seconds. Next, a warning appeared on the screen saying that the test series would begin. Participants saw a row of plus signs at the center of the screen for 500 ms, which was replaced by the prime for 200 ms. Then, the prime disappeared, and the probe word was displayed on the line below. Participants had to indicate as accurately and quickly as possible whether the probe word exactly matched one of the words in the preceding paragraphs, pressing the X or / keys (immediately on the right and left of the space bar on a French AZERTY keyboard). The specific designation of the yes or no keys was counterbalanced between participants. If the participant made an error, the Dutch equivalent of the word error appeared on the screen for 2 seconds; otherwise, the next prime-probe pair was shown after .5 seconds. This was repeated for six prime-probe pairs. After the sixth probe, participants had to press the space bar for the next trial. The trials appeared in a different random order for each participant.
One of the six primes was the experimental prime, which consisted of either the name of the actor, the verb representing the action, or the control prime ready, which was followed by the implied trait as probe. The computer combined four of the experimental sentences with each of the three experimental primes randomly for each participant. The other five prime-probe pairs were fillers (to avoid strategic guessing of the probe word or other deliberative strategies) taken from the experimental or filler paragraph. The order in which the prime-probe pairs appeared was randomized, with the provision that the experimental prime-probe pair never appeared first and that other primes or probes that consisted of words from the experimental paragraph always appeared after the experimental prime-probe pair (to avoid prior priming of the experimental sentence). Half of the probe words required a yes response, and the other half (including the implied trait) required a no response.
The exact distribution of the five filler probes and filler primes was copied from McKoon and Ratcliff (1986, pp. 85-86) . With respect to the filler probes, one probe word consisted of one word from the experimental paragraph, and four other probe words consisted of two words from the filler paragraphs and two new words. With respect to the filler primes, one prime consisted of another word from the experimental sentences (in two thirds of the cases) or the word ready (in one third of the cases; i.e., the same proportion as for the experimental primes). The four other primes were another two words from the filler paragraphs or the word ready. The computer selected these primes and probes randomly for each participant.
RESULTS
All error rates and RTs (for correct responses) were averaged per condition. Because the RT data were positively skewed, we computed all statistical tests on the log 10 transformed RT data, although for convenience the back-transformed log 10 RT data are reported in the figures and the text. In line with the conservative approach of Uleman, Hon, et al. (1996) , outlier RTs were identified if they exceeded more than 3 standard deviations from the log 10 RT mean of the participant across all conditions and were removed (there were three outlier RTs in the present data). If all responses in a condition were incorrect, participants' overall RT mean across all conditions was substituted in that condition (this occurred in 1 case or 0.43% of the data). These data transformations were applied in this and all subsequent experiments. We also applied other methods for identifying RT outliers as suggested by Ratcliff (1993) , but none of them changed the RT results appreciably.
Before testing our hypotheses, we first wanted to make sure that the trait inferences were encoded spontaneously also in this novel primed recognition paradigm. As noted earlier, the recognition paradigm is based on the assumption that people who have drawn trait inferences from the paragraphs are more likely to report incorrectly that they read the trait probe word in the text. So we would expect higher error rates or longer RTs when the trait probe follows the neutral ready prime. An appropriate control for checking this prediction is participants' responses to nontrait filler probe words that are unrelated to the text (i.e., that also require a no answer) and that are also preceded by the ready prime. Comparing these two conditions, we would expect higher error rates or longer RTs when the neutral ready prime is followed by the trait probe rather than a nontrait filler probe. Although the error rates did not differ (11% with a trait probe and 9% with a nontrait probe), as expected, there was a reliably longer RT when the probe was a trait (1,284 ms) rather than a nontrait filler word (1,224 ms), t(76) = 2.50, p < .015. This confirms that the traits were inferred spontaneously while reading the text.
We now turn to our hypotheses of interest. The average error rate in function of prime type is depicted in the top half of Figure 1 . As can be seen, there was an increase in errors both after the verb and actor prime consistent with our expectations. The data were explored using an Figure 1 and also reveal the expected inhibition of responses after both the verb and actor prime. The same ANOVA with the log transformed RTs as dependent variables revealed a marginally significant main effect for the prime, F(2,75) = 2.30, p < .098. Further planned comparisons revealed that the actor and verb prime significantly slowed down responses in comparison with the neutral prime, F(1,76) = 4.20, p < .044. The difference between the actor and verb prime was not significant, p > .45.
DISCUSSION
The consistency of the results in this experiment for both error rates and RTs strongly suggest that associations were formed between the inferred traits and the action as well as with the actor. Moreover, the nonsignificant differences between actor and verb primes seem to indicate that the strength of the trait-associations was equivalent for both the action and the actor. The previous results suggest that during reading of paragraphs which favor trait inferences, an association is spontaneously formed between the inferred trait and the actor in addition to the association with the action. This indicates that traits are not only used to interpret the actor's behavior but also to describe dispositions about the actor. However, these results are open to a number of alternative explanations. First, the immediate trait-behavior associations may have been indiscriminately generalized to other significant words of the sentences, including the actor. Second, the trait may have been associated with the actor for other reasons, for instance, to describe the actor's behavior or state or because the trait was presented together with the actor (e.g., when communicating a trait of someone else, the actor may become tainted with the delivered message) (see Carlston et al., 1995) . These explanations can be ruled out if we can demonstrate that the trait-actor associations are not necessarily always formed when reading trait-implying sentences but only when certain conditions are met. This is the aim of the second experiment.
In particular, we manipulated the extent to which the actor would be considered responsible for the behavior by providing additional information that implied the actor or the stimulus object as the cause of the behavior. If the causal responsibility of the actor is confirmed, then person inferences should be drawn as in the first experiment. On the other hand, if the actor is seen as not responsible, then such inferences should not be made. This pattern of results should effectively rule out the alternative explanations mentioned above.
How can the responsibility of the actor be manipulated? Recent attribution research indicates that Kelley (1967) covariation dimension of distinctiveness is highly relevant for dispositional inferences (Hilton, Smith, & Kim, 1995; Van Overwalle, 1997) . Specifically, covariation information indicating that the actor engaged in the behavior not only when the particular stimulus object was present but also in the presence of many similar objects (low distinctiveness) increases attributions to the actor. For instance, if your daughter not only asked about stars but also about all other celestial bodies, this should increase your confidence that she is really a smart and curious girl. On the other hand, information indicating that the actor engaged in the behavior only when a particular stimulus object was present and not when other objects were also present (high distinctiveness) increases attributions to the object and decreases attributions to the actor. Thus, if your daughter asked about stars and about nothing else, you might infer that the cause of her curiosity is due to the object (i.e., something about stars), and this should reduce your certainty that she is a curious girl.
In addition, we expect that covariation information will influence the identification of the behavior in a similar way as inferences to the actor. For example, when there are strong indications that your daughter's question about stars was caused by situational cues, it seems less likely that her behavior will be identified as curious (Trope & Lieberman, 1993) . Rather, it might be interpreted as receptive or obedient (e.g., when invited by the teacher to ask a question about stars).
Hence, in this experiment we created an additional covariation information condition. Each of the experimental sentences was accompanied by information that implied either the actor or the object as the cause of the behavior. When the covariation information implied the actor as the cause of the behavior, we expected the same inhibition effect on accuracy or RTs following the actor and verb prime as in the previous experiment; in contrast, when the information indicated the object as the cause, we expected the inhibition effect to disappear after the actor and verb prime.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 48 males and females who were paid 100 Belgian Franks (about U.S.$3) in return. Two participants were excluded because their responses on the 12 experimental sentences were erroneous in more than 50% of the cases, leaving 46 participants for analysis.
Stimulus Materials and Procedure
The stimulus materials and procedure were the same as in the previous experiment. The only difference was that the experimental trait-implying sentences and filler paragraphs now also conveyed distinctiveness information, randomly determined for each participant. This produced a prime type (actor, verb, ready) by information (actor vs. object) design. The distinctiveness information was always given before the experimental sentence.
1 Low distinctiveness information implying the actor was given as in the following example (the distinctiveness information is in italics):
Arnold did not stop asking about all celestial bodies and also asked where the stars come from.
In contrast, high distinctiveness information implying the object was given as follows:
Arnold did not ask anything about celestial bodies except for where the stars come from.
RESULTS
The data were transformed and analyzed as before. There were two outlier RTs in this experiment; 13 RT means (or 4.71 % of the data) had to be substituted by participants' overall RT mean because there were no correct responses.
To validate whether the trait inferences were encoded spontaneously, we first performed the same comparison as in the first experiment, that is, between trait probes and nontrait filler probes that follow the ready prime. These data were analyzed using a 2 (probe type) × 2 (covariation information) ANOVA. The results were similar as in the first experiment. There were no differences in error rates (14% with a trait probe and 13% with a nontrait probe), but as expected, the RTs were slowed down given a ready prime followed by a trait probe (1,161 ms) in comparison with a nontrait filler probe (1,107 ms), although this difference only approached significance, F(1,45) = 3.32, p = .075. There were no other significant differences. These results again suggest that the traits were inferred spontaneously while reading the paragraphs.
We now turn to the hypotheses of interest. The average error rate in function of prime type and information condition is shown in the top half of Figure 2 . As can be seen, consistent with our predictions, there was an increase in error rates for both verb and actor prime in the actor-implying information condition, whereas there was no such increase in the object-implying condition. An ANOVA with prime type and information condition as within-participant factors and error rate as dependent variable revealed a significant main effect of information, F(1,45) = 8.53, p < .005, and of prime, F(2,44) = 3.77, p < .031, although the interaction was not significant, p > .50. We then tested our specific hypotheses for each of the information conditions with planned 456 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN comparisons. As predicted, in the actor-implying condition, the error rates were significantly increased after both the actor and verb prime in comparison with the neutral prime, F(1,45) = 5.42, p < .024. In contrast, in the object-implying condition, as predicted, the error rates did not increase after both the actor and verb prime in comparison with the neutral prime, F(1,45) = 0.83, p = .368. In neither condition was the difference between the actor prime and the verb prime significant, p >.40. The average RTs (for correct responses only) are shown in the bottom half of Figure 2 , and the log transformed RTs were explored using the same analyses. The main or interaction effects in the ANOVA showed no significant differences, Fs < 1.60, ps > .22. In addition, none of the planned comparisons that tested our specific hypotheses reached significance, ps > .17. The lack of reliable differences in RTs are probably due to the larger standard deviations and the loss of RT data (because of insufficient correct responses) in this experiment, because only two sentences were available in each condition as opposed to four sentences in the first experiment.
DISCUSSION
The error rates in this experiment suggest that trait associations were formed with both the actor and the action when the covariation information confirmed the responsibility of the actor in causing the behavior. In contrast, when the covariation information suggested a cause away from the actor, then the trait associations with the actor and action disappeared. This pattern of results is incompatible with some alternative noninferential explanations in terms of simple generalizations of sentence words, mere descriptions of the actor's behavior, or passive associative processes as described earlier. Contrary to what these explanations predict, the trait-actor associations disappeared given object-implying information, which strongly suggests that the spontaneous trait inferences observed in this and the previous experiments explicitly refer to dispositional characteristics of the actor.
The finding that covariation information may moderate a spontaneous trait inference process is rather novel and interesting. However, it is not immediately clear how this process operates. There are at least two potential explanations as to how the trait-actor associations are influenced, in particular, how the trait-actor associations disappear in the object-implying condition. A first explanation assumes that trait inferences are made spontaneously but not automatically (i.e., its occurrence can be controlled). That is, the appropriate preconditions must be in place before the trait inference is drawn (e.g., the actor must be considered responsible). If this precondition is not met, the inference is simply not made. This line of reasoning is consistent with other work by Uleman and colleagues that showed that preconditions such as processing goals and the diagnosticity of behavioral information determine the strength of spontaneous trait inferences (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994) . Note that this explanation requires that the covariation information is also encoded and analyzed spontaneously during reading. This seems quite plausible, because covariation information is potentially as much diagnostic for making trait inferences as the behavioral descriptors themselves (Hilton et al., 1995; Van Overwalle, 1997) .
Another explanation is that trait inferences were made automatically (i.e., they cannot be prevented from occurring) but that these inferences were later corrected for the situational constraints embedded in the objectimplying information. This reasoning is in line with theorizing by Gilbert (1989) . Because participants were given sufficient time to read this information and were not distracted by other tasks, according to Gilbert such a correction process is likely to occur. Note, however, that this explanation also requires that the covariation information was encoded and analyzed spontaneously while reading the text, because otherwise the situational information would not have been available for correcting the trait inferences afterward.
In sum, both alternative explanations imply that the covariation information was encoded spontaneously but that they differ with respect of how it was used: before (precondition) or after (correction) making the trait inference. Our results seem to lend some support to the first explanation. The finding that the additional information was effective only when given before the traitimplying sentence and not when given afterward (see Note 1) suggests that appropriate preconditions must be met before the trait inference is drawn spontaneously as Uleman would predict.
EXPERIMENT 3: RECOGNITION WITH DEADLINE
A potential confound of the recognition method is that, because of its very nature, the participant is required to check the probe against the remembered paragraph. Critics of the method have argued that it is therefore impossible to determine whether any inferences detected are drawn at the time of encoding the material or at the time of testing and retrieval (Keenan, Potts, Golding, & Jenning, 1990) . To address this criticism, McKoon and Ratcliff (1986, Experiment 4) developed a deadline procedure that requires participants to answer so quickly that one can be quite confident that most conscious retrieval processes are eliminated and only spontaneous inferences are measured. In particular, after showing a probe word for 350 ms, their participants had exactly 300 ms to decide whether this word was in the preceding paragraph.
In the present experiment, we implemented this deadline procedure on the same material as in the first experiment, and we expected the same increase of errors both after the verb and actor prime. In contrast, for the RTs, we expected no substantial differences because the deadline would tend to squash the responses within the imposed time limit (see also McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986 , Experiment 4).
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 109 male and female 1st-year students at the Dutch Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Belgium). They participated in the experiment as part of an introductory psychology course requirement. Unlike the previous experiments, participants were not excluded on the basis of error rates because the deadline procedure was expected to increase the error rates substantially (i.e., the short response window should prevent participants to enter a conscious correction process to alter their incorrect yes answer following a trait probe). However, 1 participant was deleted because none of his answers were within the imposed time limit.
Stimulus Materials and Procedure
The same stimulus materials and procedure was used as in the first experiment. The only major differences were the inclusion of the deadline procedure, which was closely modeled after Experiment 4 of McKoon and Ratcliff (1986) , and the inclusion of a delay between prime and probe. First, participants were given practice at responding quickly using an unrelated lexical decision task, in which 200 prime-probe pairs were presented using a similar procedure as in the previous experiments. The prime was either ready or some other word displayed for 200 ms, followed by a blank screen for 100 ms or 300 ms (the delay). Next, the probe was shown for 250 ms, and then a row of asterisks was presented below it. Because we did not know in advance which delay would be sufficient, we used two different delay intervals. Approximately half of the participants were randomly assigned to a 100 ms delay condition (n = 56), and the other half was assigned to a 300 ms delay condition (n = 52).
Participants were instructed to respond exactly within 300 ms after the asterisks appeared to whether the probe was a word by pressing the appropriate yes or no key. Half of the probes required a yes answer, and the other half a no answer. If the participant made an error, the word error appeared on the screen for 600 ms. Then, the RT was displayed for 750 ms. In addition to McKoon and Ratcliff's (1986) procedure, extra feedback was given when participants did not respond within the allotted time frame, because during pretesting we observed that this request was not so easy to comply with. If participants answered too early (i.e., before the asterisks appeared), a message was displayed indicating that they should respond after the asterisks; if participants answered too late (i.e., not within 300 ms), the message said that they should respond before the 300 ms had elapsed. The next prime-probe pair began after a pause of 500 ms.
After every 10th pair, summary feedback indicating the number of errors for the last 10 pairs was displayed for 600 ms. If participants made three or more errors, they were encouraged to try better next time. After 2 sec-
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PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN onds, they were instructed to press the space bar when ready to continue to the next 10 pairs. Next, the participants turned to the practice and experimental trials of the main recognition task. The stimulus material and procedure for presenting the paragraphs was the same as the first experiment, and the procedure for presenting the six prime-probe pairs was the same as in the lexical decision practice, with the following modifications. The probe word was presented for 350 ms instead of 250 ms (although the participants were still instructed to give their response within 300 ms after the asterisks). Feedback was similar as in the lexical decision practice, with the exception that if a participant responded too early, a random RT between 1 and 15 ms was displayed as feedback rather than an error message to avoid unduly distraction from the task. After the sixth prime-probe pair, the same summary feedback was displayed as in the lexical decision practice.
RESULTS
The data were analyzed as before, except that responses that were either too early or too late were omitted for the calculation of the mean accuracy. There were no outlier RTs in this experiment, but given the high error rate, 107 RT means (or 33.02%) had to be substituted by participant's overall RT mean because there was no correct response.
As a validity check that the trait inferences were made spontaneously, we compared trait probes with unrelated filler probes that follow the ready prime as in the previous experiments. However, neither the error rates (52% for a trait probe and 48% for a nontrait probe) nor the RTs (95 ms for a trait probe and 97 ms for a nontrait probe) revealed any difference. This is not very surprising. Given that longer RTs were the only consistent effect found in the previous experiments, we suspect that the deadline procedure used here compressed any such potential differences.
We now turn to the hypotheses of main interest. The mean error rate across the two delay conditions is depicted in the top panel of Figure 3 . A mixed ANOVA with delay interval as between-participants factor and prime type as within-participants factor revealed only a marginal significant effect for the prime, F(2,105) = 2.54, p < .084. Because neither delay nor its interaction were significant (ps > .40), we pooled the data across the two delay conditions for further planned comparisons to test our hypotheses. These tests showed, as predicted, a significant tendency to make more errors both after the actor and the verb prime in comparison with the ready prime, F(1,106) = 5.08, p < .026. The two experimental primes did not differ from each other, p > .82. Separate planned comparisons in each of the delay conditions revealed that the anctor and verb prime failed to reach significance after a 100 ms delay, F(1,55) = 2.04, p = .159, but approached significance after a 300 ms delay, F(1,51) = 3.04, p = .087.
The RTs (for correct responses) are displayed in the bottom panel of Figure 3 . The same ANOVA on the log transformed RT data revealed no significant main or interaction effects as we had anticipated, ps > .22. Pooling the data across the two delay conditions confirmed that there were no significant differences between the prime conditions. ous trait inferences are directly associated with both the action and the actor. Moreover, the use of a deadline procedure strongly suggests that these associations were made spontaneously during encoding rather than retrieval, with almost no deliberative processing.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of the present experiments strongly suggest that trait inferences that are spontaneously made while reading trait-implying sentences do not only refer to an interpretation of the actor's behavior but also serve to describe explicitly the disposition of the actor. This reinforces the findings of Carlston and Skowronski (1994) (see also Carlston et al., 1995) , which indicated that trait inferences are equally strong when made spontaneously or when made deliberately to form an impression about the actor; and contradicts earlier research that seemed to suggest that trait inferences primarily refer to the type of action and not to the disposition of the actor, except when they are made deliberately (Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994) or when participants have a clear tendency to engage in social categorization judgments (Moskowitz, 1993a) .
Our experiments assessed the existence of trait inferences associated with the actor and with the behavior directly by using a novel primed recognition paradigm. The results of Experiment 1 showed that priming with the actor or the verb (action) of the sentences both impaired the accuracy and speed of correct responses. This clearly suggests that during encoding, trait inferences were spontaneously associated with both the actor and the action. The deadline procedure implemented in Experiments 3 further confirmed that the trait-actor associations occurred spontaneously and unintentionally, although the results were somewhat complicated by the methodological artifact that the sentence verb was a less optimal prime of the actor's behavior under this accelerated procedure. Our data suggested that to typify the behavior, the verb prime first needed an extra delay of 100 to 300 ms, most probably to activate additionally the prepositional phrase related to the sentence verb. It should be recognized, however, that because of this extra delay, some very brief unwanted strategic or other conscious processes may have intervened between the presentation of the prime and the probe so that the trait inference was not wholly spontaneous.
The results of Experiment 2 further added evidence that certain conditions need to be met to obtain a reliable trait inference about the actor. Essentially, the participants must believe that the actor was causally responsible for the action before a trait association was made to him or her; otherwise, the association was not formed. This strongly supports our contention that spontaneous inference processes refer explicitly to the actor's dispositions and are not due to other noninferential associations, because there was no evidence of trait-actor associations when the information did not favor causal attributions to the actor. Given that the same sentences in Experiment 1 revealed the predicted trait associations with the actor when no such attributional information was presented, this also suggests that the trait-implying sentences used in our Experiments 1 and 3 carried with them the implicit suggestion that the actor caused the event. This seems plausible, as most sentences contained action verbs that tend to imply the person as the cause of the event (Rudolf & Försterling, 1997) .
Experiment 2 opens a number of interesting questions for further research. The results suggest that the covariation information was integrated spontaneously as part of an ongoing process of person impression. If this is correct, then the question arises when and how this information was used. Was the actor-implying information used before the trait inference was made as a kind of precondition as would suggest? Or was the object-implying information used after the trait was automatically inferred in a sort of correction process as Gilbert (1989) would argue? Our finding that the information was effective only when given before a spontaneous inference could be drawn from the traitimplying sentence but not when given afterwards seems to confirm suggestion that covariation information acts as a precondition for making spontaneous inferences. This interpretation is reinforced by findings of Lupfer, Clark, Church, DePaola, and McDonald (1995) who, using a similar recognition paradigm (without priming, see Experiment 2), also failed to show any reliable effect of covariation information given after the focal trait-implying sentences. However, the question of whether and how covariation information is integrated in person impression is still much an open question that requires further research.
We are quite confident that the present recognition paradigm is a valid measure of the spontaneity of inferences because, first, it measures inferences immediately after reading the trait-implying sentences rather than after a considerable delay as in many previous studies (e.g., Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Uleman, 1987; Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994; Winter & Uleman, 1984; Winter et al., 1985) . Second, it goes against the ostensible task demands by increasing errors and RTs the stronger inferences are activated spontaneously. Third, by embedding the experimental sentences and cues in a larger pool of fillers, it minimizes the possibility that participants built strategic expectancies. Fourth, when implemented with a deadline procedure, it prevents strategic checking strategies during retrieval (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986) . In sum, the recognition paradigm, when confirmed by a 460 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN deadline procedure, appears to be a very powerful method by which to study spontaneous inferences. However, some authors have argued that there are more appropriate methods that can minimize conscious processes even further (Keenan et al., 1990) . Indeed, the very fact that a recognition procedure was used requires participants to check the trait cue against the sentence just read. Therefore, it might be fruitful to replicate the present research with other paradigms that can detect spontaneous inferences perhaps even more reliably, such as a lexical decision task or a modified Stroop paradigm (Keenan et al., 1990) . To date, we know only of one study on trait inferences in which a lexical decision task was used (Lupfer et al., 1995, Experiment 3) . This study confirmed that traits are spontaneously inferred after reading trait-implying sentences.
To conclude, our results confirm that during encoding of trait-implying sentences, trait inferences that are spontaneously drawn manifestly refer to the actor. This finding was revealed under both normal and deadline recognition procedures, confirming that the inferences were spontaneously made. The results also suggest that one important limiting condition for this trait association to occur is that the perceiver must believe that the actor was the cause of the event. Our data suggest that additional covariation information (Kelley, 1967) given before the trait-implying description may spontaneously confirm or discount this causal belief and the related trait-actor association. However, more research is needed to confirm whether this information was processed entirely spontaneously and under which conditions (e.g., extra memory load) its impact may perhaps disappear. NOTES 1. In a preliminary study (N = 53), we found no reliable effect of the distinctiveness information when given after the experimental sentence (e.g., "Arnold asked where the stars come from. He did not stop asking [He did not ask anything] about all other celestial bodies"). Not only was there a significant increase of errors given actor-implying information after the actor and verb prime (28%) in comparison with the neutral prime (13%) as we would expect, F(1,52) = 7.43, p < .009, but there was also an unexpected increase of errors after the actor and verb prime (27%) in comparison with the neutral prime (15%) given object-implying information, F(1,52) = 6.44, p < .014. There were no reliable differences in RT. These results suggest that the covariation information was ignored or not integrated when provided after the trait-implying sentence.
2. In a preliminary study (N = 39), we found the predicted inhibition of accuracy only after the actor prime, t(38) = 3.33, p < .004, but not after the verb prime, t(38) = 0.87, p > .38. The lack of a verb prime effect is very surprising, because theories on dispositional attribution (e.g., Carlston & Skowronski, 1986; Gilbert, 1989; Trope & Lieberman, 1993) predict that inferred traits are first associated with the action and are only later on associated with the actor. Thus, if the actor prime shows any predicted effect, then the verb prime should have shown this same effect as well. That we did not find any effect of the verb prime might have been due to a methodological artifact. In contrast with the actor prime (the name of the actor), which unequivocally refers of the actor, the verb prime (the main verb of the sentence) is a somewhat more ambiguous and vague referent of the whole action. This implies that the verb in itself may be insufficient to typify the behavior so that the prepositional phrase is also necessary to further disambiguate the sort of behavior the actor is engaged in (see also Carlston & Skowronski, 1986 ). For instance, in the sentence "Arnold asked where the stars come from," the verb prime asked may be insufficient on its own to infer the trait curiosity; but the prepositional phrase "where the stars come from" adds more compelling and unambiguous information for this trait inference. From the perspective of an associative memory, this means that the verb prime must activate not only the sentence verb, but activation should also spread to the prepositional phrase before a complete identification of the behavior is possible. To solve this methodological problem, we inserted a delay of 100 or 300 ms between the prime and the probe. This should give sufficient time for the spreading of activation from verb to prepositional phrase to take place.
3. Given the high error rates in this experiment, we also analyzed the RTs of the incorrect responses. However, these results also revealed that the RTs did not differ reliably.
